The financial crash of 2008 was worldwide, and the failure of governments to address the causes of the crash also was worldwide. Because the same thing happened in different countries under different leaders, the reasons for failure are systemic, not just the personal failings of particular leaders. The solution must be systemic. A mere change in leaders is not enough.
John Lanchester, writing in the London Review of Books, wrote an excellent article about the crash and its aftermath. I hoped to call attention to it in my previous post, but, as of this writing, there has been only one click on the link.
I know people are busy and have many claims on their attention. If you don’t want to bother reading the full LRB article, here are some highlights. If you’re an American, bear in mind that, even though so much of what he wrote applies to the USA, his focus is on British policy.
The immediate economic consequence was the bailout of the banks. I’m not sure if it’s philosophically possible for an action to be both necessary and a disaster, but that in essence is what the bailouts were.
They were necessary, I thought at the time and still think, because this really was a moment of existential crisis for the financial system, and we don’t know what the consequences would have been for our societies if everything had imploded. But they turned into a disaster we are still living through.
The first and probably most consequential result of the bailouts was that governments across the developed world decided for political reasons that the only way to restore order to their finances was to resort to austerity measures. The financial crisis led to a contraction of credit, which in turn led to economic shrinkage, which in turn led to declining tax receipts for governments, which were suddenly looking at sharply increasing annual deficits and dramatically increasing levels of overall government debt.
So now we had austerity, which meant that life got harder for a lot of people, but – this is where the negative consequences of the bailout start to be really apparent – life did not get harder for banks and for the financial system. In the popular imagination, the people who caused the crisis got away with it scot-free, and, as what scientists call a first-order approximation, that’s about right.
In addition, there were no successful prosecutions of anyone at the higher levels of the financial system. Contrast that with the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s, basically a gigantic bust of the US equivalent of mortgage companies, in which 1100 executives were prosecuted. What had changed since then was the increasing hegemony of finance in the political system, which brought the ability quite simply to rewrite the rules of what is and isn’t legal.